



Report to the House of Delegates
Fast Track Negotiating Authority*
RECOMMENDATION
BE IT RESOLVED, That the American Bar Association supports the renewal
of legislation providing for the President's fast track negotiating authority, as
introduced in the Trade Act of 1974 and later extended.
REPORT
1. The United States, as a founder of the liberalized world trading system
established by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), as a signa-
tory to the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO), the
North American Free Trade Agreement (the NAFTA) and other important inter-
national trade agreements, and as a participant in ongoing discussions toward
the development of a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), has an important
national interest in maintaining the integrity of these international agreements
and in pursuing the further liberalization of international trade. For these reasons,
the American Bar Association continues to support efforts of the Government
of the United States to liberalize international trade, consistent with the objectives
as stated in the preamble to the WTO agreements of raising standards of living
and allowing for optimal use of the world's resources in accordance with the
objective of sustainable development, seeking both to preserve the environment
and to enhance the means for doing so.'
2. Since the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934, Congress has periodi-
*This Recommendation and Report was approved by the House of Delegates in February 1997.
Stephen J. Powell and Carlos A. Garcia were the principle authors of this Recommendation and
Report for the International Trade Committee, co-chaired by Edward J. Krauland and G. Hamilton
Loeb.
1. See Preamble to Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization.
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cally delegated authority to the President to negotiate trade agreements with other
nations, subject to approval by Congress. However, this system of Presidential
negotiation and ordinary Congressional approval did not always function to the
satisfaction of the United States or its trading partners. In fact, disagreements
between Congress and the President, which both play important roles in U.S.
trade policy,2 have resulted in the United States' failure to implement changes
to U.S. laws arising from agreements negotiated by the President. For example,
following the Kennedy Round of multilateral trade negotiations, Congress specifi-
cally rejected agreements on certain non-tariff barriers, and several trading parties
withdrew equivalent concessions made to the United States during the negotia-
tions. The House Committee on Ways and Means later explained that this episode
"convinced our major trading partners that previous negotiating procedures were
futile if U.S. negotiators could not make commitments they were sure the U.S.
would both accept and implement in terms of domestic laws." 3
3. Tensions between Congress and the President arising from each branch's
claim to Constitutional authority to shape international trade agreements have
revealed a problem to which the United States' trading partners are sensitive:
without a structural vehicle for power-sharing between the two branches, the
United States cannot effectively negotiate trade agreements requiring Congres-
sional approval. 4 Fortunately, Congress was able to address the power-sharing
problem, while preserving its Constitutional authority, in the Trade Act of 1974,
which authorized the President to negotiate and implement tariff reductions sub-
ject to approval by Congress through a special "fast-track" procedure. Fast-track
means that an agreement will be voted on without amendments and within a fixed
period of time: Members simply vote for or against a measure on the fast track,
and are not permitted to offer amendments to it. As part of this procedure, the
Trade Act of 1974 provided a detailed consultative mechanism to keep Congress
informed, to ensure opportunities for Congressional advice to negotiators during
2. As stated by Professor C. O'Neal Taylor:
Trade negotiating authority, in its current form, provokes a great deal of attention
and concern because the negotiation of international trade agreements requires the
combined efforts of two branches of the federal government. By its terms, the Constitu-
tion gives Congress authority over U.S. international trade issues because it has the
power to "lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts, and Excises" and to "regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations." On the other hand, the President is empowered
to make treaties and has been described as the representative of the United States in
foreign affairs matters. Thus, if the United States is going to enter into an international
agreement concerning trade matters, the two branches must act together."
C. O'Neal Taylor, NAFTA and the Fast Track, 28 GEo. WASH. J. INT'L TRADE 1 (1994) (citing
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 3; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2).
3. Report of the House Committee on Ways and Means, Trade Agreement Act of 1979, H.R.
REP. No. 317, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
4. The balance struck between Congress and the President for constitutional authority over
trade policy and negotiations must result in a process for trade negotiation that is both accountable
to public interests, and efficient and effective to preserve U.S. leadership.
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trade negotiations, and to enhance Congressional involvement in the drafting of
implementing legislation.
4. Fast track's procedures encourage interaction and cooperation between
Congress and the President as the two branches develop an agenda for the Presi-
dent to pursue during negotiations which may result in the need for Congress to
pass related domestic legislation. Referring to the cooperation required between
Congress and the President under the Trade Act of 1974 and subsequent legislative
improvements of fast track, Professors Ackerman and Glove posit that
[a]lthough the Constitution requires the senators to give their "advice" as well as
their "consent" to treaties, this text lapsed into desuetude over the centuries. Today's
Senate often confronts completed agreements that it can reject or revise only on
pain of international embarrassment. In contrast, the Trade Act provides a dynamic
framework through which Congress can give effective advice before the President
signs on the dotted line....
[T]he Trade Act insists that the President consult with all relevant committees,
include members of Congress in American negotiating delegations, and provide
ninety day notice of an intention to sign any agreement. In discharging these func-
tions, the executive must generate reams of paper explaining how its evolving propos-
als satisfy the Act's detailed statement of objectives. More important than the paper
trail is the genuine discussion and serious horse-trading that go[es] on during the
advisory period. Thus, this modern statute has redeemed the promise of "advice
and consent" in a way that eluded the constitution-writers of 1787. 5
5. The no-amendment process is a vital component that demands Congres-
sional-Executive cooperation in order to remain effective. It provides both
branches with incentives to complete most of the intra-governmental negotiating
prior to the commencement of, and certainly prior to the conclusion of, the
negotiations themselves. The predictability of the government's process is essen-
tial to foreign trading partners negotiating agreements with a president operating
under fast track authority. 6 The importance of the fast track's time-frame and
of congressional-executive cooperation in the pre-negotiation development of
international trade policy was highlighted by the Senate Committee on Finance
during consideration of the initial fast track provision in 1974:
Our negotiators cannot be expected to accomplish the negotiating goals of Title I [tariff
and non-tariff authority] if there are no reasonable assurances that the negotiated
agreements would be voted up or down on their merits. Our trading partners have
expressed an unwillingness to negotiate without some assurances that the Congress will
consider the agreements within a definite time-frame.
5. Bruce Ackerman and David Glove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARV. L. REV. 801,
904-905 (1995) (citations omitted).
6. The expedited, no-amendment legislative process under fast track also avoids the effective
renegotiation of agreements after they are presented to Congress through the president through the
addition of "reservations," amounting to unilateral conditions, which trading partners must accept
if the agreement ever is to become effective. See Ackerman & Glove, supra at 905.
7. Report of the Senate Committee on Finance, Trade Reform Act of 1974, S. REP. No. 1298,
93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 107 (1974).
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6. Since its introduction, fast track has been a useful tool that has been renewed
and refined over time. 8 In this process, fast track has played a significant role
in expanding U.S. exports, reducing prices of imported goods, and improving
the quality of life in the United States. As observed by the House committee
during the 1979 extension of fast-track authority for an additional eight years
(until January 3, 1988):
[E]xtension of this authority provides the President with an essential tool to reduce
barriers to U.S. exports, a necessary element of export expansion, vital to U.S. economic
well-being in the future.9
Prior to the most recent expiration of fast track authority in April 1994, the
procedure had enabled the United States to negotiate and implement the
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (the Uruguay Round
GATT negotiation), the NAFTA, the U.S-Canada Free Trade Agreement, and
the U.S.-Israel Free Trade Agreement.
7. Other countries will not enter into a bargain with the United States that
Congress could try to "reopen" through selective amendments. Thus, an up or
down vote on the entire bargain is critical. This is why the European Union and
Canada emphasized the importance of fast track to the successful conclusion of
the Uruguay Round and the NAFTA, respectively. Similarly, discussions with
Mexico, Canada and Chile concerning Chile's accession to the NAFTA were
suspended by Chile in 1995 when it was evident that fast track would not be
renewed that year. Mexico and Canada now await renewal of fast track prior to
engagement in further NAFTA negotiations.
8. Without fast-track authority, it appears there will be no meaningful negotia-
tions to provide for the inclusion of additional countries within the NAFTA
pursuant to its provisions for accession. In addition, without fast-track authority,
it will be impossible for the United States to engage its trading partners in more
advanced FTAA negotiations or to remain effective in advancing current talks
toward a binding FTAA agreement. Similarly, without fast-track authority the
other member nations of the WTO will be unwilling to negotiate new or revised
multilateral trade agreements with the United States. If the United States is not
equipped with its most useful tool for advancing its trade agenda, it jeopardizes
its leadership role within the shifting global economic community.
8. For example, Congress's ability to monitor and contribute to the process of developing
negotiating policy was expanded in the late 1980s through the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness
Act of 1988 (Pub. L. No. 100-418). This Act provided additional provisions on consultations with
Congress, requiring the USTR to submit an annual statement to the House Committee on Ways and
Means and the Senate Finance Committee setting forth trade policy objectives and priorities, actions
and legislation to achieve them, and progress toward their accomplishment. It also required the USTR
to seek advice from congressional advisors and provided for Members of Congress to be accredited
as official advisers to U.S. delegations to trade conferences, meetings and delegations.
9. Report of the House Committee on Ways and Means, Trade Agreement Act of 1979, H.R.
REP. No. 317, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 184 (1979).
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9. In summary, the American Bar Association views fast track legislation as
essential to the liberalization of trade because it provides a necessary structure
for power-sharing between Congress and the President in the process of negotiat-
ing and implementing international trade agreements. Because fast track has been
successful and other nations are unwilling to negotiate important trade agreements
without it, the American Bar Association continues to view fast track as a neces-
sary component of the United States' regime for international trade negotiation
and policy development. Approval of this resolution is consistent with a similar
resolution approved by the Board of Governors on May 9, 1991, supporting an
earlier extension of fast track authority.
Conclusion
Through this Resolution, the American Bar Association supports the renewal
of fast-track negotiating authority, without judging the merits of any agreement
that might be submitted to Congress under such authority. In so doing, the Ameri-
can Bar Association expresses its support for continued negotiation in pursuit of
a system of rules that has the potential to provide the basis for increased trade,
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